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INTRODUCTION
Nowadays the use of samples of human biological materials, 
obtaining of which, as a rule, is often carried out with the use 
of medical procedures, is quite common in the criminal pro-
cedure. At the same time, procedures for such samples taking, 
their use and retention are often bordered with violations of 
human rights guaranteed by the Convention. Therefore, there 
may be a violation of the prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the 
Convention); violation of the right to a fair trial, in particular in 
the context of the right not to incriminate oneself (Article 6 of 
the Convention)1; as well as the violation of the right to respect 
for private life (Article 8 of the Convention). Therefore, today 
there are quite acute questions: medical intervention without 
the person’s consent; compulsory takiing of human biological 
materials; clinical methods, the use of which in the biological 
samples taking will not be regarded as violation of international 
standards of human rights protection; the correlation of the 
need for the formation of DNA profile databases and the right 
of the person to non-disclosure of medical information.
THE AIM
The aim of this work is to identify and analyze the key 
points of the ECHR regarding the peculiarities of reten-
tion and use of human biological material samples in the 
investigation of crimes, and the retention of such materials 
after the completion of the investigation and trial.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In the preparation of the article, scientific works, the pro-
visions of international normative acts regulating the use 
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ABSTRACT
Introduction: The use of modern advances in medicine to investigate crimes has caused a number of problems that require scientific reflection. In particular, today there are 
quite acute questions: medical intervention without the person’s consent; forced sampling of human biological materials; clinical methods, the use of which in the biological 
samples taking will not be regarded as violation of international standards of human rights protection; the correlation of the need for the formation of DNA profile databases 
and the right of the person to non-disclosure of medical information.
The aim: The aim of this work is to identify and analyze the key points of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the ECHR) regarding the peculiarities 
of retention and use of human biological material samples in the investigation of crimes, and the retention of such materials after the completion of the investigation and trial.
Materials and methods: In the preparation of the article, scientific works, the provisions of international normative acts regulating the use of human biological materials 
as well as the practice of the ECHR concerning the use of human biological materials in the investigation of crimes were used (8 decisions were analyzed in which the ECHR 
concerned the use of biological samples or related issues). In the research process to achieve the goal, a complex of general scientific and special methods of cognition was used, 
in particular, the comparative legal method, the system and structural method, the method of generalization, the method of analysis and synthesis, etc.
Review: The positions of the ECHR concerning the following were distinguished and generalized: a) the criteria for the permissibility of compulsory medical intervention for 
taking of human biological material within the framework of the crime investigation; b) the possibilities of spreading the right not to incriminate oneself on the compulsory 
taking of human biological materials samples; c) the retention features of cell samples and DNA information in the context of respect for the right to non-interference in the 
person’s private life. 
Conclusions: Obtaining and using the human material for the investigation of crimes are not a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter – the 
Convention), subject to the requirements stated in the practice of the ECHR. 
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1  The right to freedom from self-closure is not directly specified in aArt. 6 of the Convention, however, is an element of the presumption of 
innocence (Funke v. France (25 February 1993) and John Murray v. The United Kingdom (8 February 1996).
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of human biological materials as well as the practice of the 
ECHR concerning the use of human biological materials 
in the investigation of crimes were used (8 decisions were 
analyzed in which the ECHR concerned the use of bio-
logical samples or related issues). In the research process 
to achieve the goal, a complex of general scientific and 
special methods of cognition was used, in particular, the 
comparative legal method, the system and structural meth-
od, the method of generalization, the method of analysis 
and synthesis, etc.
REVIEW
Obtaining samples of biological materials without 
the person’s consent and the prohibition of torture 
(Art. 3 of the Convention). In this context, first of all it 
should be pointed out that in practice, the ECHR clearly 
distinguishes between the need for compulsory medical 
procedures that are caused by therapeutic indications and 
compulsory medical procedures that are not conditioned 
by therapeutic indications and aimed at obtaining evidence 
in the investigation of a crime. At the same time, the use of 
compulsory procedures for the taking of biological sam-
ples for the purpose of investigating a crime by itself does 
not indicate a violation of the rights of a person provided 
for in Art. 3 and Art. 8 of the Convention. Accordingly, 
in Case of Jalloh v. Germany, the ECHR indicated the 
following, “Even where it is not motivated by reasons of 
medical necessity, Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention do 
not as such prohibit recourse to a medical procedure in 
defiance of the will of a suspect in order to obtain from 
him evidence of his involvement in the commission of 
a criminal offence. Thus, the Convention institutions have 
found on several occasions that the taking of blood or saliva 
samples against a suspect’s will in order to investigate an 
offence did not breach these Articles in the circumstances 
of the cases examined by them” [1]. However, in view of the 
aforementioned delimitation of medical intervention (with 
a therapeutic aim and for obtaining evidence to investigate 
a crime), the ECHR uses slightly different approaches in 
assessing the admissibility of such medical intervention 
limits. In particular, the ECHR permits a greater degree 
of coercion in situations that are conditioned precisely 
by medical indications. With regard to the same medi-
cal intervention in order to obtain evidence, it will not 
be violated by the Convention solely on condition that 
such a procedure would correspond to the key principles 
formulated by the ECHR. The ECHR position in Case of 
Salikhov v. Russia is quite indicative in this key, where the 
ECHR stated the following, “It is observed at the outset that 
the clipping of the applicant’s fingernails and the attempt 
to take his blood were not required by medical reasons, 
that is, they were not needed to protect the applicant’s 
health. Rather, those procedures were aimed at securing 
evidence of a rape. This finding does not of itself warrant 
the conclusion that the intervention contravened Article 3, 
as the Convention does not, in principle, prohibit recourse 
to a forcible medical intervention that will assist in the 
investigation of an offence. Nevertheless, any interference 
with a person’s physical integrity carried out with the aim of 
obtaining evidence must be the subject of rigorous scrutiny, 
with the following factors being of particular importance: 
the extent to which forcible medical intervention was 
necessary to obtain the evidence, the health risks for the 
suspect, the manner in which the procedure was carried 
out and the physical pain and mental suffering it caused, 
the degree of medical supervision available and the effects 
on the suspect’s health. In the light of all the circumstances 
of the individual case, the intervention must not attain the 
minimum level of severity that would bring it within the 
scope of Article 3. The Court will now examine each of 
these elements in turn” [2].
Obtaining samples of biological materials without the 
person’s consent and the right not to incriminate oneself 
(Art. 6 of the Convention). It is also worth pointing out 
that the ECHR practice raised the question of whether 
the compulsory taking of biological samples violated the 
right not to incriminate oneself. It should be recalled that 
according to the legislation of most European states, as well 
as in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, 
a person has the right not to testify against himself, and 
the forced obtaining of such testimony is considered ille-
gal. Taking into account the above rule, there were cases 
where the applicants, applying to the ECHR, extended the 
right not to incriminate oneself to situations of compul-
sory taking of biological samples. At the same time, the 
ECHR in this key follows a clear position that the right to 
freedom from self-restraint extends solely to verbal infor-
mation (testimony) and does not relate to the acquisition 
of human biological samples. In particular, the position 
of the ECHR was expressed in Case of Saunders v. United 
Kingdom, where the following was stated, “The right not 
to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, 
with respecting the will of an accused person to remain 
silent. As commonly understood in the legal systems of 
the Contracting Parties to the Convention and elsewhere, 
it does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of 
material which may be obtained from the accused through 
the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence 
independent of the will of the suspect such as, inter alia, 
documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood 
and urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of 
DNA testing” [3]. 
However, it is interesting to note, that in another judg-
ment (Case of P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom), 
a similar approach not only found complete support, but 
was also extended to human voice samples. In particular, 
as the ECHR pointed out, “In so far as the applicants com-
plained of the underhand way in which the voice samples 
for comparison were obtained and that this infringed their 
privilege against self-incrimination, the Court considers 
that the voice samples, which did not include any incrim-
inating statements, may be regarded as akin to blood, hair 
or other physical or objective specimens used in forensic 
analysis and to which privilege against self-incrimination 
does not apply” [4].
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The use of human biological materials samples in the criminal 
procedure and the right to respect for private life (Art. 8 of the 
Convention). Today, taking of biological samples (cell samples, 
DNA information, fingerprints2) is quite common for many 
European countries. In particular, most European countries 
allow the compulsory taking of fingerprints and cell sampling in 
the context of criminal proceedings. At least 20 member states 
of the Council of Europe have provided provisions for DNA 
information taking and its retention in national databases or 
in other forms (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). The number of such coun-
tries is gradually increasing [see at: 5]. It is permitted to use 
DNA material in the investigation of crimes and at the level 
of international regulations (in particular, the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to Application of Biology and Medicine [6]).
 At the same time, an analysis of the ECHR practice pro-
vides an opportunity to argue that the main disputes are not 
because of taking and use of such data within the framework 
of crime investigation, but the further retention of bio sam-
ples while the investigation and trial are already completed. 
The question of retention of human tissue samples that were 
taken during the investigation of a crime is very relevant 
nowadays in the first place from the point of view of ensur-
ing the right to respect for private life. At the same time, not 
being new, this question has not yet found a clear solution 
either in science or in practice. In particular, an analysis of 
the ECHR practice provides an opportunity to state that 
there is no unified approach. The question is usually solved 
based on individual circumstances of the case. Nevertheless, 
an analysis of the existing decisions of the ECHR still gives 
the opportunity to distinguish some general laws.
 However, before turning to the description of these laws, 
we should note that some of the most general provisions 
regarding the rules for the use and retention of biological 
samples of human tissues (in particular, DNA data) in the 
investigation of crimes have been raised at the level of the 
Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe of 10 February 1992 No. R(92)1 On the 
use of analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) within the 
framework of the criminal justice system [7]. According to 
this document, member states are encouraged to adhere to 
the following principles in relation to the use of bio samples 
and information derived from them:
- The taking of samples for the purpose of DNA analysis 
should only be carried out in circumstances determined by the 
domestic law; it being understood that in some states this may 
necessitate specific authorisation from a judicial authority;
- Recourse to DNA analysis should be permissible in all 
appropriate cases, independent of the degree of seriousness 
of the offence;
- Samples collected for DNA analysis and the information 
derived from such analysis for the purpose of the investi-
gation and prosecution of criminal offences must not be 
used for other purposes;
- Samples taken for DNA analysis and the information 
so derived may be needed for research and statistical 
purposes. Such uses are acceptable provided the identity 
of the individual cannot be ascertained. Names or other 
identifying references must therefore be removed prior to 
their use for these purposes;
- Samples or other body tissues taken from individuals for 
DNA analysis should not be kept after the rendering of the 
final decision in the case for which they were used, unless it 
is necessary for purposes directly linked to those for which 
they were collected. Measures should be taken to ensure that 
the results of DNA analysis and the information so derived 
is deleted when it is no longer necessary to keep it for the 
purposes for which it was used. The results of DNA analysis 
and the information so derived may, however, be retained 
where the individual concerned has been convicted of serious 
offences against the life, integrity or security of persons. In 
such cases strict retention periods should be defined by do-
mestic law. Samples and other body tissues, or the information 
derived from them, may be stored for longer periods: when 
the person concerned so requests; or when the sample cannot 
be attributed to an individual, for example when it is found 
at the scene of an offence. Where the security of the state is 
involved, the domestic law of the member state may permit 
retention of the samples, the results of DNA analysis and the 
information so derived even though the individual concerned 
has not been charged or convicted of an offence. In such cases 
strict retention periods should be defined by domestic law [7].
It is clear that in its decisions the ECHR cannot ignore the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe’s general 
recommendations; therefore starting positions are drawn 
from them. In particular, when considering complaints 
related to the retention of bio samples, the ECHR not only 
addresses the question of whether there is interference 
with the sphere of privacy and whether such interference 
with public interests is commensurate, but also explores 
aspects such as:
- Differentiation of the interference degree with privacy 
in the use of bio samples, depending on the specificity of 
such bio samples (or information received from them): 
fingerprints, cells, DNA profiles;
- Severity (qualification) of a crime as a factor influencing 
the decision on the question of the admissibility of the use 
and retention of bio samples and the information obtained 
with their use and the term of such retention;
- The results of the investigation (in which the biological 
samples were taken) and the trial, in particular, whether 
the person was convicted or acquitted.
Therefore, summarizing some practice, we will try to 
distinguish the ECHR’s generalized positions according to 
key aspects.
1. Human tissue samples (including DNA samples) contain 
personal data, and therefore their taking and retention is 
2  The reference of fingerprints to biomaterials is controversial, but we recall them in the light of the ECHR practice, which follows the principle 
of delimiting such samples as (a) cells, (b) DNA data and (c) fingerprints. 
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always an interference with privacy. In general, the position 
of the ECHR on this issue was as follows. In addition to the 
person’s name, their private and family life may include other 
means of personal identification and family ties. Data con-
tained in cells and DNA data are definitely a kind of personal 
data, since it is not only possible to identify a person, but 
also to observe their kinship ties, to establish ethnicity, etc. 
Moreover, any obtaining and retention of personal data by 
public authorities, no matter how they were received, should 
be considered as having a direct impact on ensuring respect 
for the privacy of the person concerned, regardless of whether 
there is any further use of these data [see at: 5; 8];
2. Such interference with private life is still permissible if this 
is due to the protection of the public interest. In general, in most 
cases, the ECHR recognizes that the public interest in com-
bating crime fully justifies the objective of biological samples 
obtaining and using. At the same time, the issue of the further 
(that is, after the completion of the investigation and trial) reten-
tion of bio samples and the information received from them by 
the ECHR is not so clear. In particular, as stated by the ECHR 
in the judgment in S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, 
the interests of the data subjects (from whom the biosphere 
was received) and community as a whole in the protection of 
personal data, including fingerprints and DNA information, 
may be outweighed by a legitimate interest in the prevention 
of crime. The court finds it to be beyond dispute that the fight 
against crime, and in particular against organized crime and 
terrorism, which is one of the challenges faced by today’s Euro-
pean societies, depends greatly on the use of modern scientific 
techniques of investigation and identification. The Court agrees 
that the retention of fingerprints and DNA information pursues 
the legitimate purpose of detection and, therefore, prevention 
of crime. If the original taking of this information pursues the 
aim of linking a particular person to the particular crime of 
which he or she is suspected, its retention pursues the broader 
purpose of assisting in the identification of future offenders [see 
at: 5]. Also, the ECHR, determined by the permissibility of bio 
samples retention, the importance of public interest that can 
afford such retention, the length of retention, emphasizes the 
need to clearly distinguish between types of biological samples, 
in particular: fingerprints, cells (biological tissue samples), and 
DNA data. This, in its turn, makes it possible to distinguish 
and formulate the following position, which is followed in the 
practice of the ECHR. 
3. The degree of interference with the right to privacy 
with the use of bio samples depends on the type of such bio 
samples (or information obtained from them): fingerprints, 
samples of biological tissues (cells), or DNA profiles3. The 
positions on this issue are primarily reflected in Van der 
Velden v Netherlands [9] and S. and Marper v. The Unit-
ed Kingdom [5] and are as follows. First of all, as it was 
already noted, the ECHR recognizes the retention of any 
bio samples, regardless of their variety, as the interference 
with the right to respect for the private life. At the same 
time, the ECHR indicates that the retention of fingerprints, 
DNA profiles and biological samples is generally more 
controversial than obtaining such bioinformatics, and 
retention of biological samples (cells) poses more ethical 
problems than digitized DNA profiles and fingerprints, 
taking into account the difference in levels of informa-
tion that can be disclosed. The retention of cell samples 
implies a particularly strong interference with the right to 
respect for private life, given the extremely high amount 
of genetic and health-related information contained there. 
Thus, according to the degree of intervention in private 
life, the ECHR provides the following gradation of human 
bio samples (given the nature and amount of information 
contained in each of them): cellular material (the highest 
level of intervention); DNA profile (average level of inter-
vention), fingerprints (the lowest level of intervention). 
This approach is substantiated by the following arguments:
- Human cell samples contain not only identifying 
information about a person, but also information about 
his or her health, the presence of diseases, etc., that is, 
information that goes beyond the scope of the need for 
a crime investigation. In addition, human cell samples 
contain a unique genetic code that can be used to form 
a DNA profile;
- The DNA profile contains a more limited amount of 
private information than the cellular material; in particular, 
it contains only identifying information along the DNA 
code and does not contain information about the health of 
the person and the presence of diseases. Nevertheless, the 
DNA code provides the ability to set data that goes beyond 
the scope of the investigation, in particular, to identify 
family ties or the ethnic origin of a person;
- Fingerprints, unlike cellular material and DNA pro-
files, provide an opportunity to identify only the person, 
but do not make it possible to identify any other personal 
information. 
4. The severity (qualification) of a crime as a factor affect-
ing the issue resolution of the permissibility of bio samples 
use and retention and the information obtained with their 
use and the term of such retention. The position on the 
need to take into account the severity and seriousness of 
a crime in deciding the use of the fight against criminality 
of human tissues is laid down in the Recommendation of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 10 
February 1992, No. R(92)1 [7]. Moreover, as stated in ECHR 
judgments, the majority of Contracting States allow the 
taking of cell materials in criminal proceedings only from 
persons suspected of committing crimes of a certain min-
imum severity. For example, in Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Sweden, the taking 
of DNA information in the context of criminal proceedings 
is limited to serious crimes, in particular those punishable 
by imprisonment [see at: 5]. In the judgment of W. v. the 
3  A DNA profile (or genetic passport) is data that contains information about the human genetic code, along with identifying data about the 
person to which this DNA profile belongs. The decisions of the ECHR refer to DNA profiles as digitized information stored electronically in 
the National DNA Database along with the identity of the person concerned (see at Case of S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom).
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Netherlands of 20 January 2009 (Complaint No. 20689/08), 
the ECHR stated that the length of retention of DNA data 
after the investigation and trial should be based on the length 
of the maximum sentence that can be imposed in relation to 
the offence. And in the judgment of Peruzzo and Martens 
v. Germany, dated 4 June 2013 (Complaints Nos. 7841/08 
and 57900/12), the ECHR found that the remedies provided 
by the relevant national law were sufficient: only the genetic 
material of recidivists or persons suspected of serious crimes, 
or crimes against sexual self-determination [10, p. 112, 116]. 
5. The results of the investigation, in which the biological 
samples were taken, and trial (in particular, whether the per-
son was convicted or acquitted), are also compulsory taken 
into account by the ECHR in deciding on the justification 
for the retention of bio samples after the completion of the 
investigation and trial from the standpoint of respect for the 
right to privacy. The general concept in this issue is as follows: 
the unlimited duration of biological samples retention and 
information received from them about persons who were 
found guilty of a crime at the police databases is justified 
by the public interest in the fight against crime. Instead, 
a similar approach to the question of biological samples 
retention of persons who were not convicted of any crime 
violates the presumption of innocence. It is significant that 
in the vast majority of European states there is a clear dis-
tinction between the procedures for retention of biological 
samples of persons, depending on whether they were found 
guilty or not guilty of a criminal offence. For example, Bel-
gium, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Sweden require that such 
information be automatically deleted in order to justify or 
stop the criminal proceedings. Germany, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands allow the retention of such information if 
there is any suspicion of a person or if further investigation 
is required in another case; Austria allows its retention, if 
there is a risk that the suspect will commit a dangerous 
offence; Norway and Spain permit the retention of profiles 
if the defendant was acquitted because he was not subject 
to criminal liability; Finland and Denmark allow retention 
for 1 and 10 years respectively, if justified, and Switzerland 
for 1 year if the proceedings were terminated [see at: 5]. At 
the same time, the provisions of the French legislation on 
the protection of fingerprints of justifiable persons during 
the twenty-five years were recognized by the ECHR as that 
is equivalent to their lifelong retention. Consequently, the 
ECHR stated that in this case the restriction of the right to 
private life was not proportional to the accomplishment of 
public interests in a democratic state [11]. It is significant 
that the results of the investigation and trial (recognition 
of a person guilty or innocent) in different ways affect the 
issues of enhanced protection of the minor’s interests. Thus, 
these results, in some cases, may further enhance the pri-
vacy of minors, and in others, to alleviate the difference in 
approaches to minors and adults. For example, in the judg-
ment of S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, the ECHR 
indicated that “the retention of the unconvicted persons’ data 
may be especially harmful in the case of minors, given their 
special situation and the importance of their development 
and integration in society”[5]. Instead, in the judgment of 
W. v. the Netherlands dated 20 January 2009 (Complaint 
No. 20689/08), the ECHR indicated that, unlike the case S. 
and Marper v. The United Kingdom, where the applicants 
were found to be innocent of a crime, that case involved the 
retention of DNA data of a person who had been prosecuted. 
Therefore, the applicant’s minor age should not influence the 
decision on the retention of his or her biological samples 
after the completion of the investigation and trial [10, p. 113]. 
DISCUSSION
The questions discussed in this article are not completely 
new. As the issue of ECHR’s interpretation of human rights 
in healthcare [see at: 12], and the question of samples of 
human biological materials amples taking and using, in 
particular regarding the application of compulsory med-
ical procedures to the patient, has already been raised 
by researchers in different contexts. At the same time, 
the review of works makes it possible to state that today 
a number of issues remain controversial. The problem of 
the formation and use of DNA databases in Poland in the 
context of the adoption of relevant laws was considered 
by M. Goc, H. Dybrowska [13], where the authors, based 
on statistical data and positive experience with the use of 
human biological samples, expressed their belief in the 
need for further intensifying the use of such samples in the 
investigation of crimes. In turn, the issue of constitutional-
ity of the DNA samples use, in particular in the context of 
Polish law, was raised in the work of J. Wójcikiewicz and 
V. Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz [14]. The discussion on the 
relationship between the privacy of information contain-
ing human DNA and the public interest in the use of such 
information in the investigation of crimes is illustrated in 
the work of R. Erbaş [15]. A similar question was raised 
by K. Dedrickson [16], where the author concludes that 
the correct approach to the creation of universal DNA 
bases will guarantee maximum achievement in the fight 
against crime, with minimal interference with privacy. 
Controversial issues of the restriction of somatic human 
rights, the specifics of the use of compulsory medical pro-
cedures depending on the procedural status of a person, 
peculiarities of the application of various medical methods 
in order to obtain evidence are illustrated in the work of 
A. Gambaryan [17].
CONCLUSIONS
1.  In practice, the ECHR clearly distinguishes between the 
need for compulsory medical procedures that are caused 
by therapeutic indications and compulsory medical pro-
cedures aimed at obtaining evidence in the investigation 
of crime. The use of compulsory medical procedures for 
taking of biological samples for the purpose of investigat-
ing a crime by itself does not indicate a violation of the 
rights of a person provided for in Art. 3 and Art. 8 of the 
Convention, but when assessing the admissibility of such 
procedures, the ECHR pays particular attention to the 
factors: the extent to which forcible medical intervention 
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was necessary to obtain evidence, the health risks of the 
suspect, the way in which the procedure is performed, 
the physical pain and the mental suffering experienced 
by the person, the degree of medical supervision and the 
impact on the suspect’s health.
2.  The ECHR maintains a clear position that the right not
to incriminate oneself is applied exclusively to verbal
information (evidence) and does not relate to taking of
human biological samples, in particular such as samples 
of blood, saliva, urine, fingernail clippings, and even
voice samples.
3.  In resolving the issue of the admissibility of restricting the right 
to respect for private life in the use of human bio samples during 
the criminal procedure, the ECHR not only decides whether
such interference with the public interest is proportional, but
also takes into account aspects such as: (a) differentiation of the 
interference degree with privacy in bio samples using, depending 
on the specifics of such bio samples (or information received
from them): fingerprints, cages, DNA profiles; (b) the severity
(qualification) of the crime as a factor affecting the permissibility 
question resolution of the use and retention of bio samples and 
the information obtained with their use and the term of such
retention; (c) the results of the investigation, in which the bio-
logical samples were taken, and the trial: in particular, whether 
the person was convicted or acquitted.
REFERENCES
1.  Case of Jalloh v. Germany, application no. 54810/00, 11 July 2006. See 
at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76307
2.  Case of Salikhov v. Russia, application no. 23880/05, 3 May 2012. See 
at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-110718
3. Case of Saunders v. United Kingdom, application no.  19187/91, 17
December 1996. See at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58009
4.  Case of P.G. and J.H. v. The United Kingdom, application no. 44787/98, 25 
September 2001. See at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59665
5.  Case of S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, applications
nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 04 December 2008. See at: http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/rus?i=001-90051
6.  Konventsiya o zaschite prav i dostoinstva cheloveka v svyazi s primeneniem 
dostizheniy biologii i meditsinyi: Konventsiya o pravah cheloveka i
biomeditsine (Oviedo, 4 April 1997) [The Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to Application 
of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine]. 
See at: https://rm.coe.int/168007d004 (in Russian).
7.  Recommendation No. R(92)1 of the Committee of Ministers on the use 
of analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) within the framework of the 
criminal justice system (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 
February 1992 at the 470th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). See at: 
https://rm.coe.int/09000016804e54f7
8.  Case of Amann v. Switzerland, application no. 27798/95, 16 February
2000. See at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58497
9.  Case of Van  der  Velden  v.  The Netherlands, application no. 29514/05, 
07 December 2006. See at: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/29514.05-
en-20061207/view/
10.  Problemy bioetiki v svete sudebnoy praktiki Evropeyskogo Suda
po pravam cheloveka [Problems of bioethics in the light of the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights]. See at:  https://
rm.coe.int/case-law-2017/1680736451 (in Russian).
11.  Case of M.K. v. France, application no. 19522/09, 18 April 2013. See at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119075
12.  Tatsiy V., Gutorova N., Pashkov V. Legal aspects of cancer deseases
prophylactics: patients rights context. Wiad Lek. 2017;71(I):1108–1113.
13.  Goc M., Dybrowska H. The present and future of DNA database in Poland. 
Z Zagadnieñ Nauk Sadowych, z. L. 2002;150–154. See at: http://www.
forensicscience.pl/pfs/50_goc.pdf
14.  Wójcikiewicz J., Kwiatkowska-Wójcikiewicz V. The constitutionality
of taking DNA reference samples. doi:  http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/
CLR.2017.009
15.  Erbaş R. The tension between genome privacy and criminal justice in
the wake of DNA databases. Journal of Penal Law and Criminology.
2017;5(2):163–178. See at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3081456
16. Dedrickson K. Universal DNA databases: a way to  improve privacy?
Journal of Law and the Biosciences. 2017;4(3):637–647. See at: https://
doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsx041
17.  Gambaryan A.S. Otkaz ot prava i voprosyi ugolovno-protsessualnogo
vmeshatelstva [Waiver and Issues of Criminal Procedure Intervention]. 
2018;352. (in Russian).
Authors’ contributions:
According to the order of the Authorship.
Conflict of interest:
The Authors declare no conflict of interest.
CORRESPONDING AUTHOR 
Ivan A. Titko
Poltava Law Institute of Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University





TOM LXXII, 2019, Nr 8, sierpień Rok założenia 1928
Aluna Publishing
Zasady prenumeraty miesięcznika  
Wiadomości Lekarskie na rok 2019
Zamówienia na prenumeratę przyjmuje Wydawnictwo Aluna:
– e-mailem: prenumerata@wydawnictwo-aluna.pl
– listownie na adres:
Wydawnictwo Aluna
ul. Z.M. Przesmyckiego 29, 05-510 Konstancin-Jeziorna
Prosimy o dokonywanie wpłat na numer rachunku Wydawnictwa:
Credit Agricole Bank Polska S. A.: 82 1940 1076 3010 7407 0000 0000
Cena prenumeraty dwunastu kolejnych numerów: 240 zł/rok (w tym 5% VAT)
Cena prenumeraty zagranicznej: 120 euro/rok.
Cena pojedynczego numeru – 30 zł (w tym 5% VAT) + koszt przesyłki.
Przed dokonaniem wpłaty prosimy o złożenie zamówienia.
Wiadomości Lekarskie  is abstracted and indexed in: PubMed/Medline, EBSCO, SCOPUS, Index 
Copernicus, Polish Medical Library (GBL), Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education.
Copyright: © ALUNA Publishing. 
Articles published on-line and available in open access are published under Creative Com-
mon Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) allowing 
to download articles and share them with others as long as they credit the authors and the 
publisher, but without permission to change them in any way or use them commercially. 
W ogłoszonym 31 lipca br. przez Ministra Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego wykazie 
czasopism naukowych Wiadomości Lekarskie otrzymały 20 punktów (pozycja 27088).
© Aluna Wiadomości Lekarskie 2016, tom LXIX, nr 4
605
Pediatria
Prof. dr hab. med. Ewa Małecka-Tendera 
(SUM Katowice)
Dr hab. med. Tomasz Szczepański 
(SUM Katowice)
Położnictwo i ginekologia
Prof. dr hab. med. Jan Kotarski 
(UM Lublin)
Prof. dr hab. med. Andrzej Witek 
(SUM Katowice)
Stomatologia
Prof. dr hab. Maria Kleinrok 
(UM Lublin)
Polskie Towarzystwo Lekarskie
Prof. dr hab. med. Waldemar Kostewicz 
(Prezes ZG PTL) 
Prof. dr hab. med. Jerzy Woy-Wojciechowski
(Prezes Honorowy PTL)




tel. 694 778 068
amarosa@wp.pl
Redakcja zagraniczna












Nakład do 6 tys. egz
© Copyright by Aluna Publishing
Wydanie czasopisma Wiadomości Lekarskie w formie papierowej jest wersją 
pierwotną (referencyjną). Redakcja wdraża procedurę zabezpieczającą 
oryginalność prac naukowych oraz przestrzega zasad recenzowania zgodnie 
z wytycznymi Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego.
Czasopismo indeksowane w:
PubMed/Medline, EBSCO, MNISW (11 pkt),  
Index Copernicus, PBL, Scopus
Redaktor naczelny
Prof. dr hab. med. Władysław Pierzchała 
(SUM Katowice)
Zastępca redaktora naczelnego
Prof. zw. dr hab.  med. Aleksander Sieroń 
(SUM Katowice)
Redaktor wydania
prof. dr hab. Maria Majdan
prof. dr hab. Mirosław Jabłoński
Redaktor statystyczny




Prof. dr hab. med. Krzysztof Bielecki 
(CMKP Warszawa)
Prof. dr hab. med. Stanislav Czudek 
(Onkologickié Centrum J.G. Mendla Czechy)
Prof. dr hab. med. Marek Rudnicki 
(University of Illinois USA)
Choroby wewnętrzne
Prof. dr hab. med. Ryszarda Chazan, pneumonologia i  alergologia 
(UM Warszawa)
Prof. dr hab. med. Jacek Dubiel, kardiologia 
(CM UJ Kraków)
Prof. dr hab. med. Zbigniew Gąsior, kardiologia 
(SUM Katowice)
Prof. dr hab. med. Marek Hartleb, gastroenterologia 
(SUM Katowice)
Prof. dr hab. med. Jerzy Korewicki, kardiologia 
(Instytut Kardiologii Warszawa)
Dr hab. med. Krzysztof Łabuzek, farmakologia kliniczna, diabetologia 
(SUM Katowice)
Prof. dr hab. med. Tadeusz Płusa, pneumonologia i alergologia 
(WIM Warszawa)
Dr hab. med. Antoni Wystrychowski, nefrologia 
(SUM Katowice)
Choroby zakaźne
Prof. dr hab. med. Andrzej Gładysz 
(UM Wrocław)
Epidemiologia
Prof. dr hab. med. Jan Zejda 
(SUM Katowice)
Neurologia i neurochirurgia
Prof. dr hab. med. Henryk Majchrzak, neurochirurgia 
(SUM Katowice)
Prof. dr hab. med. Krystyna Pierzchała, neurologia 
(SUM Katowice)
Redaktor naczelny
Prof. dr hab. med. Władysław Pierzchała 
(SUM Katowice)
Zastępca redaktora naczelnego









Prof. dr hab. med. Krzysztof Bielecki 
(CMKP Warszawa)
Prof. dr hab. med. Stanislav Czudek
(Onkologickié Centrum J.G. Mendla Czechy)
Prof. dr hab. med. Marek Rudnicki 
(University of Illinois USA)
Choroby wewnętrzne
Prof. dr hab. med. Marek Hartleb, gastroenterologia 
(SUM Katowice)
Prof. dr hab. med. Jacek Dubiel, kardiologia 
(CM UJ Kraków)
Prof. dr hab. med. Zbigniew Gąsior, kardiologia
(SUM Katowice)
Prof. dr hab. med. Jerzy Korewicki, kardiologia
(Instytut Kardiologii Warszawa)
Dr hab. med. Antoni Wystrychowski, nefrologia
(SUM Katowice)
Prof. dr hab. med. Ryszarda Chazan, pneumonologia 
i alergologi  (UM Warszawa)
Prof. dr hab. med. Tadeusz Płusa, pneumonologia 
i alergologia (WIM Warszawa)
Choroby zakaźne
Prof. dr hab. med. Andrzej Gładysz 
(UM Wrocław)
Epidemiologia
Prof. dr hab. med. Jan Zejda 
(SUM Katowice)
Neurologia i neurochirurgia
Prof. dr hab. med. Krystyna Pierzchała, neurologia
(SUM Katowice)
Prof. dr hab. med. Henryk Majchrzak, neurochirurgia
(SUM Katowice)
Pediatria
Prof. dr hab. med. Ewa Małecka-Tendera 
(SUM Katowice)
Dr hab. med. Tomasz Szczepański 
(SUM Katowice)
Położnictwo i ginekologia
Prof. dr hab. med. Jan Kotarsk  
(UM Lublin)
Prof. dr hab. med. Andrzej Witek 
(SUM Katowice)
Stomatologia
Prof. dr hab. Maria Kleinrok 
(UM Lublin)
Polskie Towarzystwo Lekarskie
Prof. d  hab. med. Jerzy Woy-Wojciechowski 
(Prezes PTL)
Prof. emerytowany dr hab. med. Tadeusz Petelenz
(O. Katowicki PTL)




Blue Sparks Publishing Group Sp. z o.o.
ul. Obornicka 15/4, 02-948 Warszawa
tel. (22) 858-92-53
Zarząd: dr Anna Łuczyńska − prezes





lub tel. (22) 858-92-53
Projekt okładki: Dorota Cybulska
Opracowanie gra czne: Tomasz Białkowski
Nakład: do 6000 egz.
© Copyright by Blue-Sparks Publishing Group
Wydanie czasopisma Wiadomości Lekarskie w formie papierowej jest wersją 
pierwotną (referencyjną). Redakcja wdraża procedurę zabezpieczającą ory-
ginalność publikacji naukowych oraz przestrzega zasad recenzowania prac 
zgodnie z wytycznymi Mi isterstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego.
Czasopismo indeksowane w: 
Medline, EBSCO, MNiSW (6 pkt), Index Copernicus, PBL.














Prof. Waldemar Kostewicz – President PTL
Prof. Jerzy Woy-Wojciechowski – Honorary President PTL
Prof. Tadeusz Petelenz
Kris Bankiewicz San Francisco, USA
Christopher  Bara Hannover, Germany
Krzysztof  Bielecki Warsaw, Poland
Zana Bumbuliene Vilnius, Lithuania 
Ryszarda Chazan Warsaw, Poland
Stanislav Czudek Ostrava, Czech Republic
Jacek Dubiel Cracow, Poland
Zbigniew Gasior Katowice, Poland
Andrzej Gładysz Wrocl w, Poland  
Nataliya Gutorova Kharkiv, Ukraine
Marek Hartleb Katowice, Poland
Roman Jaeschke Hamilton, Canada
Andrzej   Jakubowiak Chicago, USA
Oleksandr Katrushov Poltava, Ukraine
Peter Konturek Saalfeld, Germany
Jerzy Korewicki Warsaw, Poland
Jan Kotarski Lublin, Poland
George Krol New York, USA
Krzysztof Łabuzek Katowice, Poland
Henryk Majchrzak Kat wice, oland
Ewa Małecka-Tendera Katowice, Poland 
Stella Nowicki Memphis, USA
Alfred Patyk Gottingen, Germany
Palmira Petrova Yakutsk, Russia
Krystyna Pierzchała Katowice, Poland
Tadeusz Płusa Warsaw, Poland
Waldem r Priebe Houston, USA
Maria Siemionow Chicago, USA
Vladyslav Smiianov Sumy, Ukraine
Tomasz Szczepański Katowice, Poland
Andrzej Witek Katowice, Poland 
Zbign ew Wszolek Jacksonville, USA
Vyacheslav Zhdan Poltava, Ukraine
Jan Zejda Katowice, Poland
Managing Editor:
Agnieszka Rosa  amarosa@wp.pl
International  Editor:
Lesia Rudenko l.rudenko@wydawnictwo- luna.pl
Distribution and Subscriptions:
Bartosz Guterman prenumerata@wydawnictwo-aluna.pl




ul. Przesmyckiego 29, 05-510 Konstancin – Jeziorna
www.aluna.waw.pl www.wiadomoscilekarskie. l
www.medlist.org
International Editorial B ard – in-Chief: 
Marek  Rudnicki Chicago, USA 
International E itorial Board – Members:
